

Capital in Palawang Practices in Lake Tempe, South Sulawesi

Sultan

Sociology Department, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia

Irwansyah

Department of Law, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia

Ansar Arifin

Anthropology Department, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia

M. Ramli AT

Department of Sociology, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia

Abstract

Writing from the title of research on capital in Palawang practice in Lake Tempe, South Sulawesi. This study uses the concept of capital developed by Pierre Bourdieu with a qualitative approach and data collection instruments through in-depth interviews with informants from government actors, entrepreneurs, big fishermen and small fishermen. The results of the study show that besides being used as a tool, economic capital is also the main goal of each actor in Palawang practice. But economic capital is not enough, so to get other economic capital, actors use other capital they have, such as cultural capital and social capital. Economic capital, cultural capital and social capital which are activated in Palawang practice have given rise to other capital, namely symbolic capital. That the Palawang practice has become a symbol of local government control of the lake's fishery resources. The practice of Palawang has also become a symbol of the domination of businessmen and large fishermen over fishing in Lake Tempe.

Keywords: *Pierre Boudieu, Capital, Palawang, Lake Tempe.*

INTRODUCTION

In Regional Regulation No.4 of 2012 concerning Management of Fishery Resources in Wajo and Soppeng Regencies, Regent Regulation No.13/Perbub/VI/2012 concerning Procedures for Management of Public Waterways and Tappareng Salae and Regional Regulation No. 4 of 2010 concerning Management of General Fisheries Resources in the Sidenreng Rappang Regency Area, explained that; Palawang is a certain place on the edge of a lake whose boundaries have been determined to be controlled by using a splint.

The splint is a fishing aid made of bamboo blades which are connected to each other and then installed in the form of a fence which functions to confine the fish so they cannot move freely (Faisal, 2008).

The results of Saad's research (2007) explained that when the area around Lake Tempe was still a sovereign kingdom, the people had the freedom to utilize the lake which at that time was controlled by the kingdom and in its development ongko rights emerged, namely the right to monopolize fishing in certain areas, one of which was

called Palawang. Another study conducted by Sani (2007) concluded that Palawang in Lake Tempe has become a local institution in which there is a set of rules that bind all parties who use it. In 2010, the Public Fisheries Research Center of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia revealed that Palawang is increasingly dominating the waters of Lake Tempe.

Economically, it is quite promising for the management. The results of the socio-economic and environmental mapping carried out by Fx. Hermawan et al (2015) show that income from Palawang is between Rp. 25,000,000-Rp. 300,000,000/year, and can even reach Rp. 500,000,000/year. However, the implication is that the fishing area decreases which causes a decrease in the catch of other fishermen, especially small fishermen who catch by moving from place to place (Nur Priyatna and Sumartono, 2011). In fact, the results of Said's research (2021) show that there has been an imbalance of power or asymmetry of power between actors over the ownership of collective assets such as knowledge, wealth and social networks in the management of natural resources at Lake Tempe and the forerunner of this is the Palawang practice. Currently, the practice of Palawang does not only refer to a physical area of fishing that has certain boundaries, but has become a practice shaped by structures and actors as owners of capital. The structure of the practice of Palawang includes the implementation of auctions and work on the land of Palawang, so that it becomes an arena that brings together state/government actors, entrepreneurs, big fishermen and small fishermen (workers) with their respective capital ownership. Each actor in principle has more than one capital but in a different amount and composition. But among the several types of capital owned there is

dominant capital and that capital is used by each actor to access other capital in Palawang practice.

For this reason, this study examines economic capital, cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital and how capital is owned and used by each actor to obtain other capital by using the concept of capital developed by Pierre Felix Bourdieu, who will hereinafter be called Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu (1990) there are 4 capitals that tend to operate in each arena, namely economic capital which includes ownership of the means of production, materials and money, cultural capital in the form of education, knowledge and skills or competence, social capital involving trust, networks and relationships and capital symbols such as prestige, self-esteem and identity.

Methods

The basis of this research is an explanatory case study (Yin, 2006), namely research whose goal is to obtain a complete and in-depth description of an entity. The case unit is the management of Palawang in Lake Tempe which involves government actors, owners of capital (money and equipment) and workers (fishermen). This research approach is descriptive qualitative, that is, it describes in depth the types of capital and their exchange in Palawang practices. Data collection was carried out by means of in-depth interviews with the principle that the informant spoke as much as possible, and the researcher spoke less but understood more. Data analysis used qualitative analysis by looking at and reading the whole while paying attention to the categorization of meanings and these meanings really have a connection with the research problem. Perform a synthesis of all units of meaning that are transformed into a

single statement in accordance with the informants' expressions and experiences.

Results and Discussion

Lake Tempe covers three districts which are directly adjacent, namely Wajo Regency, Soppeng Regency and Sidenreng Rappang Regency. Each district has a Palawang area which is owned and controlled by the local government, but the management and work is handed over to the community through an auction system. In Wajo Regency, the period of control and management of Palawang by the community who won the auction is 2 years. However, during this 2 year period, only eight months (1 May – 31 December) each year became full control and management for the winning bidder, the remaining four months (January-April) became open access for other fishermen. Then in Soppeng Regency the tenure and management of Palawang is only one year and within that time only six months (1 July – 31 December) becomes the full right for the auction winner, outside of this time it becomes open access for general fishermen. In Sidenreng Rappang Regency it is carried out every 2 years with a 2-year mastery period and during that time there is no break for access to other fishermen for 2 years.

The structure of the Palawang practice includes the implementation of the auction and the execution of Palawang for the auction

winner. The implementation of the auction is an arena that brings together actors who own the land and actors participating in the auction, while the Palawang construction brings together the actors who win the auction and the laborers who are employed. Therefore, in Palawang practice, there are four actors who own capital, namely state actors, entrepreneurs, large fishermen and small fishermen. The state actor is the owner as well as the Palawang land auction committee. Then the entrepreneur actor is the owner of the capital (money) invested in the construction of Palawang. Meanwhile, large fishermen are fishermen who have financial capital and fishing equipment who play a role in the auction and construction of Palawang. Then small fishermen are actors who help big fishermen as laborers in making Palawang.

As landowners and auction committees, the state/local government determines the price of Palawang land to be auctioned and then disseminates it through information media that makes it easier for the local community to find out, for example through places of worship (mosques), Lurah/Village Offices, District Government Offices, through local print and electronic media or social media. Each of them sets the price so that between one Palawang and the other in each region it is different. For example, the estimated or range of prices set in Wajo and Soppeng Regencies:

Table 1. Location/Land and Estimated Price of Palawang in Lake Tempe

Regency	Location name/lahan Palawang	Price (estimated)
Wajo	1) Latedong Ambo Kati S. Sadae, 2) Laelo, 3) Labempa, 4) Labadu, 5) Barumanian, 6) Lawettoing, 7) Alau Salo, 8) Orai Salo, 9) Tosarita, 10) Todaddi, 11) Jampue, 12) Tomarujung	9.000.000-300.000.000
Soppeng	1) Tebbue/Mallawae, 2) Aladie, 3) Lompo Maniang, 4) Pengae, 5) Annung 6) Lebbae, 7) Bentengnge, 8) Manggalunge, 9) Paware'e, 10) Ujung Alupang, 11) Sepa' Bakke, 12) Topagoling, 13) Lompo Manorang, 14) Ongkoe	13.000.000-85.000.000

The price for each Palawang land is determined based on the physical condition of the land such as the number of aquatic plants and the distance of the land location from the edge of the lake. The more water plants that grow and the closer the location of the land from the edge of the lake tends to be more expensive compared to other Palawang fields. Palawang land which is overgrown with plants such as water spinach is considered to have more fish compared to areas that are clean or only have expanses of water visible. Likewise, the distance to the land also affects the price, the closer to the edge of the lake it tends to be rather expensive, because apart from the potential profit from the fish, it also comes from short-term crop yields during the dry season.

For residents who are interested in participating in an auction based on that price, they must follow the auction rules set by the auction committee, such as; 1) Participants receive a recommendation from the local government (Kelurahan/Desa/Camat) in accordance with the desired location area and are required to deposit a security deposit/down payment, 2) Bidders who have won the previous auction but have not paid the price, are not allowed to participate in the next auction, The location to be auctioned is based on a predetermined base price with a closed bidding auction system, 3) The auction winner is determined by the committee based on the highest bid but if the same bid occurs, a re-auction will be held which will only be attended by the highest bidder, 4) Security deposit has been deposited by the winner becomes part of the payment while those who do not win the security deposit will be returned to the person concerned, 5) Locations that have not been auctioned off and are not paid off no later than six working days after the auction, it becomes the right of the auction

committee to hold another auction ((Source: Department of Fisheries of Wajo Regency and Kab. Soppeng 2021).


Even though the auction is open to the public and prioritized fishermen around the lake, not many fishermen can access it. Only fishermen who own capital, especially cash capital, fishing equipment and networks, have opportunities, while small fishermen only expect jobs from big fishermen who win the auction. BG, one of the informants for Palawang workers in Wajo Regency, revealed that working on Palawang was quite large because it required auction costs and the cost of procuring fishing equipment so that only those who had enough money could do it. The required auction fee depends on the price and the amount of land desired by each bidder. Likewise with the cost of procuring fishing gear, especially splints (fishing aids), depending on the number of reels needed. The cost for procuring fishing equipment ranges from Rp. 20,000,000-Rp. 50,000,000. Apart from that, there are also direct fishing gears such as nets and nets (lanra) of around Rp. 80,000-Rp. 400,000 per unit as well as other operational costs. The results of calculations and simulations by HS, one of the informants in Soppeng Regency, regarding the costs required to procure and install the splint are as follows; splint cost/price; length 125 cm width 150 cm Rp. 30,000/roll, the price of wood is Rp. 2000/stick, the price of bamboo is Rp. 2000/stick and pertalite fuel price (retail) Rp. 10,000/liter. If 1 Palawang land uses 1000 rolls of splints, 2500 sticks of wood, 500 bamboo sticks and 500 liters of fuel then; $(1000 \times \text{Rp. } 30,000) + (2500 \times \text{Rp. } 2000) + (500 \times \text{Rp. } 2000) + (500 \times \text{Rp. } 10,000) = \text{Rp. } 41,000,000$ (estimated cost per Palawang).

There are three categories of large fishermen, namely those with cash capital, those with

fishing gear (slats) and those with both. Therefore, fishermen who only have money or fishing gear usually cooperate either with fellow fishermen or with entrepreneurs who will invest their capital. The form of cooperation between fellow fishermen is usually fishermen who own money who participate in the auction and fisherman who own tools who work on it (Hasbi, 2023). Whereas cooperation between fishermen and entrepreneurs is usually in the form of capital participation, meaning that entrepreneurs only entrust their financial capital to fishermen in cash for auction costs and or procurement of fishing gear. Fishermen who have cash and equipment tend to do it themselves, from the auction to the execution of Palawang.

Not only fellow fishermen and entrepreneurs, but also large fishermen tend to have a direct network with the government and the auction committee as well as small fishermen who will be employed. In simple terms, the network/relationships activated by actors in Palawang practice are as follows:

Figure 1. Network/Relationship of Capital Owned Pe in Palawang Practice



In this study it was found that in Palawang practice there were various forms of networks and relationships which were activated by actors who owned capital. These networks and relationships were told by informants who experienced and did it themselves. For example, the experiences of HK informants and HB, who were both fishermen, had

established relationships and collaborated for three periods of managing Palawang. The form of relationship and cooperation is between fishermen who have financial capital and fishermen who own fishing equipment. HK as the owner of the money capital plays a role in participating in the auction and trying to win every desired Palawang land. The land won by HK was handed over to HB to work on and assisted by laborers (5-6 people/Palawang) recruited by HB. Another experience between AR and BG informants, namely between businessmen who have financial capital and fishermen who own fishing equipment. AR as the owner of cash capital plays a role in preparing and handing over the amount of money needed to BG to participate in the auction. After winning the auction, BG will also work on it as well as recruiting his own workers to help him. Unlike the others, the HS informant actually independently prepared funds for auctions and fishing equipment and recruited laborers to be employed.

The income potential from the Palawang practice tends to be large for both the auction winner and the local government as the owner of the Palawang land. In fact, according to the informant HS, the benefits of Palawang can also be obtained from its agricultural products during the dry season, such as planting corn, watermelon and legumes. According to the HK informant, the net income for the auction winner for each auction period can reach Rp. 300,000,000-Rp. 400,000,000. The results are shared using a profit-sharing system, for example, if the net income of 1 Palawang is IDR 300 million, then the entrepreneur (the owner of the cash capital) gets IDR 180 million and IDR 120 million is divided between the owner of the equipment and the workers employed. Meanwhile, the potential income from Palawang management practices

for regional governments by district is as follows:

Table 2. Regional Revenue from Palawang Auction Results

Palawang Location	Number of Locations	Auction Result (Rp)		Sum
		2011 – 2013	2014 – 2016	
Wajo County				
Tempe District	19	121.427.700	129.500.000	250.927.700
Sabbangparu District	3	317.000.000	378.363.363	695.363.363
Tanasitolo District	1	35.550.000	25.000.000	60.550.000
Belawa District	4	426.499.800	507.115.000	933.614.800
Total	27	900.477.500	1.039.978.363	1.940.455.863
Soppeng Regency				
Donri-Donri District	1	216.770.000	195.7000.000	412.470.000
Marioriawa District	11	1.447.551.621	1.036.520.000	2.484.071.621
Total	12	1.664.321.621	1.323.220.000	2.896.541.621
Sidenreng Rappang Regency				
Panca LAutang District	2	800.225.000	5.334.000	1.055.559.000

Source: Secondary Data of Fisheries Service of Wajo Regency and Soppeng Regency, Sidrap Regency 2017

According to the NP informant (Kadis Perikanan Wajo Regency) that the management of Lake Tempe through the Palawang system has the potential to increase regional income from the inland fisheries sector, so we will continue to do this pattern and method while taking into account the physical environmental conditions of Lake Tempe, especially fish populations and species. which tends to decrease over time, so that the government periodically restocks by sowing fish seeds. In addition, in order to maintain the continuity of the practice of Palawang, the local government stipulates work rules which include: (1) If the surface of the lake water is still approximately 30cm above the tip of the splint (the splint height is 125cm) then general fishermen can still catch fish freely in the Palawang area, (2) Palawang managers are not allowed to install the splints more than twice a year, namely in a tiered manner except in a predetermined place, (3) If the Palawang managers are proven to take fish in and out intentionally opening the splints with the intention of giving way for the fish to enter their Palawang then public fishermen are

entitled to it, (4) Palawang managers may not install traps facing outward from Palawang itself, (5) Managers may not prohibit public fishermen from catching fish within a distance of not less than 30 meters, (6) Managers may not install their splints more than twice a year, namely by how to stack except in a place that has been determined, (7) If the water exceeds the splint (125 cm), which has been installed, it is no longer permissible to move it to a place where the water level is lower (Source: Department of Fisheries, Kab. Wajo and Kab. Soppeng 2021).

By using the concept of capital developed by Bourdieu that the four capitals in question, namely economic capital, cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital, are in principle all owned by each actor but in different amounts and compositions. Therefore, each actor uses certain dominant capital that he has to access and obtain other capital in the Palawang practice arena. The arena as conceptualized by Bourdieu in Michael Grenfeel (2008) and David Swartz (1997) is a space formed and managed by the

owner of capital, either one capital or a combination of the four capitals referred to.

In the context of the Palawang practice arena, actors use their dominant capital as a tool to obtain one or more of the existing capital.

Each actor considers that the capital used is quite functional in the Palawang practice arena. So it appears that there is the use of the same or different capital for each actor in the same or different capital goals or targets.

Table 3. Actors and Types of Capital in Palawang Practice

Types of Capital	Capital Owner Actor			Little fisherman actor
	State/Local Government Actors	businessman actor	g fisherman actor	
Capital owned and employed				
Economic Capital	+	+	+	-
Cultural Capital	+	-	-	+
Social Capital	-	+	+	+
Symbolic Capital	-	-	-	-
Capital obtained				
Economic Capital	+	+	+	+
Cultural Capital	-	-	-	-
Social Capital	-	-	-	-
Imbolic S capital	-	-	-	-

Source: Primary Data 2021

State/local government actors use their economic capital and cultural capital. The economic capital referred to is the ownership of the Palawang land which will be auctioned, while the cultural capital is the knowledge that is owned by each apparatus and is used to regulate the implementation of the auction and the execution of Palawang. Big businessmen and fishermen actors use their economic capital and social capital. Economic capital in the form of money and fishing gear and social capital in the form of social networks and relationships. Whereas small fishermen who work as laborers only own and use cultural capital in the form of knowledge and skills and social capital in the form of relationships and trust, especially for large fishermen to access Palawang work. This capital is used by actors to get the same capital or other different capital.

One of the objectives of using capital owned by each actor is to obtain other capital, especially economic capital. The economic capital that the state/local government actors want to get from the capital used is an amount of money from the sale proceeds of each Palawang land sold in the auction, so that the more land that is sold, the more money capital is generated. Likewise with large entrepreneurs and fishermen who use economic capital and networks, want some money from the sale of fish from the Palawang land they manage so that the size of their income will depend on the amount of catch they get. For small fishermen who are employed as laborers, they will receive wages from the profit-sharing system that has been established in Palawang management practices.

The dominance of economic capital used or desired by each actor indicates that economic

capital in the management of Palawang tends to be more flexible and independent compared to other capitals. Indeed, according to Bourdieu (1986: 53-55). Likewise, network capital and social relations as well as the experience and skills possessed by workers can be converted into a sum of money from a profit-sharing system with large fishermen. Bourdieu (1986:47) asserts that economic capital can be converted into money or in the form of property rights, cultural capital such as educational qualifications and skills can be converted into economic capital, social capital in the form of connections or networks and can be converted into economic capital and can also be institutionalized in the form of an honorary degree (symbolic capital).

However, behind the convertible and flexible economic capital, there is cultural capital that is used by the government to regulate the process of transferring or exchanging capital in Palawang practices. Bourdieu (1986) referred to as the objectified state of the implementation of the auction and construction of Palawang made by the local government, which refers to the material in the form of written documents (written regulations) resulting from the process of using education and knowledge owned by its apparatus. . This objectified cultural capital has become the institutionalized state, meaning that the rules made by the government are used as a guide in every auction and Palawang work. Cultural capital that is objectified and institutionalized according to Boudieu is a form of capital that tends to be inherited, so that the rules as a cultural product have been passed down from generation to generation by the local government in Palawang practices. The strategy of using cultural capital, besides being intended to obtain and increase economic capital, is also to further strengthen the

legitimacy of ownership and control for the state/government over all of Palawang land and even the entire Tempe Lake area.

Although one of the objectives of Palawang practice is for the benefit of economic capital and strategies for controlling it through cultural capital, the arena of Palawang practice also depends on social capital as a liaison between actors as owners of investors. Bourdieu (1986) considers social capital as actual and potential resources owned by a person originating from social networks that tend to be institutionalized and take place continuously in the form of mutual recognition and introduction. Social networks function as lubricants, bridges, and adhesives (Damsar and Indrayani, 2015). Social networks are used to provide convenience for every actor, especially entrepreneurs, large fishermen and small fishermen as laborers, to be able to access other capital, especially economic capital, while also facilitating and strengthening relations between capital owners.

For this reason, any actor in the Palawang practice who owns, uses and obtains a large amount of economic, cultural and social capital will indirectly receive symbolic capital such as being a party/person in power, educated, wealthy and has broad associations. And vice versa, those who do not own or have a little of these capital tend to be controlled and even marginalized. Ownership of Palawang land and the establishment of management rules for it become a symbol of control over the entire Palawang land and even the entire Tempe Lake area by the State/local government. This rule becomes a symbol of legitimacy so that its validity forces all parties or other actors (businessmen and fishermen) to obey and follow these rules (Lampe, 1996). Anyone interested in obtaining management

rights through an auction system must comply with all regulations set by the state/local government. Then from the perspective of ownership of money capital and fishing equipment by businessmen and large fishermen, making the practice of Palawang a symbol of exclusivity by certain groups or parties has even become a symbol of marginalization for small fishermen in carrying out fishing activities in the lake. The work on Palawang has also become a symbol of domination through patron-clinical relations between investors and Palawang workers with a profit-sharing system. The profit-sharing system is a form of domination, but for workers it is something that is considered right because it has been passed down from generation to generation.

It is the role of capital that dynamizes Palawang practice and according to Bourdieu (1984) it is capital that gives meaning and value to every arena, including the Palawang practice arena. Therefore, the practice of Palawang will depend on the extent to which these assets have the meaning and value of each actor. This means that when the Palawang land is still considered to have economic value, government actors will continue to use their knowledge capital to continue to manage the Palawang arena. Likewise, if the regulation is deemed not burdensome and the Palawang land is still considered profitable, businessmen and fishermen will continue to buy the Palawang land that is being auctioned off. Likewise, if the production sharing system for Palawang is still considered profitable, the workers will also continue to take advantage of their social relations and skills to gain access to Palawang from large fishermen.

Conclusion

Economic capital dominates Palawang practice both as a tool used and as a goal to be achieved. Likewise, the ownership of money and equipment owned by businessmen and large fishermen is used as a tool to obtain management rights and some money from the sale of fish from the Palawang land they manage. The practice of Palawang has become a symbol of control and control by the government over fishery resources and a symbol of the domination of large entrepreneurs and fishermen in Lake Tempe. Meanwhile, the cultural capital owned and used by workers is to get jobs from big fishermen.

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