

The Indonesian Main Island Defense: Land Power Projection Towards Maritime Orientation

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Abstract

Indonesia is an inimitable country due to its massive archipelagic and maritime features, which acts as a magnet in determining its geopolitical and geostrategic position. Challenges come to reality incrementally facing the emerging threat in the region, especially the non-traditional threat with its evolving approaches. This study employs qualitative descriptive to analyze the essence of the Indonesian Main Island(s) Defense to shifting its land power paradigm towards a maritime orientation. The study portrays that the Indonesian main islands defense, originally, is a part of the strategic territorial defense system putting the main island(s)—on a critical circumstances e.g. invasion scenario—as strategic compartment(s) in defending the sovereignty of the state. Land power which based on Indonesian Army empowering the whole national power on the main island(s) ought to conduct its strategic effort up to its last resort autonomously for that sake. Addressing the upcoming potential threats shifted by the evolving warfare based on high-tech destructive weapons, the Indonesian Army on the main islands requires development from its original setting towards maritime orientation by utilizing technological advancement that, at one side reducing geographical barriers, and the other side, integrating the land forces to reinforce the maritime and air power to contending the future typical threats dominated by maritime and air domain. Through the development of this basic concept, the Indonesian main islands defense becomes the main pillar to orchestrating the archipelagic defense for a rigorous defense strategy.

Keywords: *Main Island Defense, Maritime Orientation, Land Power, Indonesia.*

Introduction

Indonesia is constitutionally referred to as an archipelagic country (Article 25 of the 1945

Constitution), characterized by more than 17,000 large and small islands spread from Sabang to Merauke. As explained in Part IV of The United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS), the geographical character that makes Indonesia an archipelagic country has received international recognition. With this international recognition, Indonesia gets an extension of sovereignty and sovereign rights over its territory with all the privileges it has as an archipelagic country.

Indonesia has a land area of 1.937 million km², a sovereign sea area of 3.1 million km², and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) sea area of 2.7 million km² (Sulistiyono, 2010). Thus, the land area in the form of islands is only about 1/3 of the ocean area. On this basis, some people refer to Indonesia as a maritime and archipelagic nation.


Geography, location, and form of nation become a magnet in determining the geopolitics and geostrategy of a country. Similar with AT Mahan's oceanic paradigm (1918), Mackinder (1919) with the Heartland theory, Spykman (1944) with the Rimland concept or Karl Haushofer who developed Friedrich's thoughts Ratzel "lebensraum" (Diehl, 1991). Aside from the paradigm chosen by a country, geography has an essential role in determining a country's national strength for national defense. Indonesia has established its geopolitics and geostrategy through its archipelago outlook which includes all the islands as a single unit of interest, political, social and cultural, economic, also defense and security (MPR Decree Number IV/MPR/1973). A unity of political, social, cultural, and economic interests in defense and security is the national interest, and it is urgent to be fought for and maintained through the national defense. The geographical condition of Indonesia as an archipelagic country is abstracted in the national defense doctrine with the principle of territoriality (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015).

Regarding the realization of the territorial principle, through the 2020-2024 National Defense General Policy, The Indonesian Main Island Defense is one of the strategic aspects and compartments as a sub-aspect that must be implemented in increasing the national defense capability.

The Indonesian Main Island Defense is less familiar when compared to the terms of territorial and centrality in the context of the Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI) title of strength (Mabes TNI, 2018, p. 37) or even compared to the doctrine of strategic compartments (Kodiklat TNI AD, 2003). Although using slightly different terms but with the same meaning, Indonesian Armed Forces Struggle Doctrine "Tri Ubaya Çakti" elaborates on the concept of defense, which makes the main islands the main areas of defense which concentrate on national power to create a defensive-strategic system (TNI AD, 1966, p. 55). Defensive-strategic is a strategic part of the national land defense system by developing defense operations against enemies with conventionally unbalanced forces. The main islands are the prominence in this doctrine, where the existence of all the defense forces on the main islands makes the main islands the point of defense power (TNI AD, 1966, pp. 98–99) in the deployment and direction of the defense force.

Observing this explanation, it can be interpreted that the main islands become the center of gravity (COG) in defense operations which are further elaborated in defensive-strategic operations when the ratio of combat power is not balanced with the enemy or offensive-strategic operations. An illustration of this explanation can be seen in the image below.

Figure 1. Position of the Main Island in Defense Operations



Source: Processed by Researchers (2021), from the “Tri Ubaya Cakti” Doctrine (1996)

Figure 1 above clearly illustrates what the position looks like and the relationship between the main islands and the elements of force in defense operations. This pattern is only applied in defense or military operations for war (OMP) as it currently applies. The "Tri Ubaya Çakti" doctrine clearly distinguishes the forms of threats from within the country (domestic) and from abroad (external). The scope of the limitations on defense operations is all operations in the framework of guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of the state and the course of the revolution against attacks and real threats from another country's war forces (TNI AD, 1966, pp. 75-76) so that the main islands are only positioned as the main areas of defense which are the point of strength in the deployment and direction for the development of defense operations.

Furthermore, the Indonesian Army (2003) renewed its doctrine by reaffirming the main islands by mentioning The Indonesian Main Island Defense. In the Regional Military Command doctrine as a Defense Strategic Compartment, The Indonesian Main Island Defense is a regional defense system that includes territorial powers. It can also be referred as an organized defense area on large

islands and a series of small islands. The Indonesian Main Island Defense aims to protect, defend, and maintain the integrity of the national land area (Kodiklat TNI AD, 2003, p. 25). Realizing this goal, large islands' defense must have a mobile defense force and may consist of one or more strategic compartments. In this doctrine, the interpretation of The Indonesian Main Island Defense is the importance of organizing the territory of large islands under one defense command. Moreover, this is one of the targets in preparing and developing strategic compartments (Kodiklat TNI AD, 2003, p. 24).

The Indonesian National Armed Forces currently have three Defense Area Joint Commands, and the existence of the Defense Area Joint Command has been determined based on the compartmentalization of the defense area (Mabes TNI, 2019a, p. 3). The division of the defense area includes land, sea, and air defense areas. Each defense area of the Joint Regional Defense Command consists of large islands, several provinces, and the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ALKI). The division of the defense area of the Joint Regional Defense Command has a typical composite compartment between large islands,

provinces, and ALKI. On the other hand, this division of the defense area has consequences for the defense area of the Joint Defense Area

Command I and II, which undeniably divides the islands of Java and Borneo islands into two commands and control, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Kogabwilhan Defense Area



Source: TNI Headquarters (2019a, pp. 27–28)

The compartmentalization of the combined defense area Command I and II, which divides the islands of Borneo and Java, impacted the dualism of command and control in realizing the defense of the large islands. This, of course, can be a fundamental problem in practice (empirical gap), where the unity of command is the principle in the use of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, both War Military Operations and Military Operations Other than War (Mabes TNI, 2018, p. 40) unlike the case with the Defense Regional Command organization at the beginning of its formation based on Presidential Decree no. 132 of 1969 concerning organizational principles and procedures for the Ministry of Defense and Security which establishes the Regional Defense Command.

As a strategic compartment in a state of military emergency within the MOMSP framework, the Regional Military Command has high dynamics, as the situation and conditions that occurred in Aceh. This context is not intended to state the incompetence of the Iskandar Muda Military Command in carrying out this function in Aceh. On the other hand, this is not to be simplified as success with hyperbolic statements to reflect the reality of other Regional Commands, which can also function

as strategic compartments under different conditions. This is an illustration of the empirical gap in the implementation of the Kodam as a strategic compartment.

The description of The Indonesian Main Island Defense and strategic compartments can also be seen in the TNI's efforts to restore security in East Timor after integration. Initiation of military operations with the formation of the Joint Task Force Command (Kogasgab) on October 7, 1975, which was codenamed "SEROJA" in the context of maintaining national stability (Disbintal TNI AD, 2005). Various operational dynamics from the beginning until finally, on July 17, 1976, East Timor officially became part of Indonesia. Since joining the territory of Indonesia, efforts to stabilize TNI security in East Timor have continued to be carried out with dynamic intensity. Since its inception, military operations have experienced several changes in operational control at the strategic and operational levels.

The threat perspective, which became a consideration in inspiring strategic thinking on these doctrines for The Indonesian Main Island Defense and the Regional Military Command as a strategic compartment, has shifted at this

time. The 2020-2024 National Defense General Policy has outlined various actual and potential threats to Indonesia. Currently, there are developments in the strategic environment at the regional scope, but they have global implications. The constellation of China vis-à-vis the United States and its allies in a dynamic rivalry will increasingly escalate to the fore. On the one hand, China insists on maintaining its territorial integrity, including Taiwan, the islands in the South China Sea, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (PRC's SCIC 2019). On the other hand, this is the antithesis of the interests of the United States and its allies in the region.

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It is predicted that China's aggressiveness in the region will economically surpass the United States in 2027 (Marshall, 2011; Purwanda & Achmad, 2022). China's gradual-collateral escalating economic progress has succeeded in transforming the military with a military budget that will be on par with the United States in 2050 (Muzalevsky, 2017). Each of them continues to strengthen itself militarily (military buildup) (Sample, 1998), China with

its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)³ defense strategy, while the United States is getting closer to its strength with strategy.

The Indonesian Main Island Defense must be realized and developed according to the 2020-2024 National Defense General Policy. However, the current assessment of threats and predictions for the future still needs to cover all threats, both in their probability and nature and form, in implementing The Indonesian Main Island Defense with strategic compartments. The potential for open war in a conventional manner needs to be carefully considered in designing a long-term strategy, as is the case with the strategy theory put forward by Edström et al. (2019, p. 4) and Colin S. Gray (2014, p. 24) and is in line with the results of research by Hew Strachan (2019). This has an essential meaning in the design of long-term strategies, as the theoretical argumentation of Tiha von Ghyczy et al. (2001) that strategy is influenced by the mandala strategy, namely the clash of wills and friction.

Bearing in mind that The Indonesian Main Island Defense and strategic compartments is more oriented towards land defense, faced with the slim possibility of a military invasion in the future and the escalation of the potential for a conventional war that will affect Indonesia, there is a need for recalibration by considering various geographical paradigms on this issue. As Hew Strachan (2019) argued in his research results, strategy is not applied rigidly but is reactive and predictive. What China has done by changing the organizational structure and functions of 7 Military Regions into 5 Theater Commands, which is placed on a paradigm shift from continental based to maritime oriented as the results of Blasko's research (2016) can be a lesson that can be learned by Indonesia, especially the Indonesian Army, in develop The Indonesian Main Island Defense and strategic compartments.

In addition, the lack of references, including previous research related to The Indonesian

Main Island Defense and strategic compartments, and the non-implementation of this concept because it has not been in a state of war since the liberation of West Irian, has made the concept of defense of large islands and strategic compartments less widely understood. This condition is known as the knowledge void (D. A. Miles, 2017; Müller-Bloch & Kranz, 2015) in defense of large islands and strategic compartments. Researchers put this rational argument, both empirical gaps, knowledge void, and theoretical gaps, which converge into research gaps (research gap).

Materials and Methods

qualitative descriptive or quasi-qualitative. Researchers will also develop research in examining phenomena that occur according to the focus and sub-focus of research. The overall research design after starting with the initial study, followed by data collection by the procedures and data collection techniques on the specified research subjects and objects. The data processing is carried out using systems and mechanisms for the selected method and a process for checking the validity of the data (data validation). To get the conclusion, the researcher used a soft systems methodology (SSM) analysis technique reinforced by an interactive model, which also serves as a model for data management. Researchers will carry out several data collection steps, starting from determining places/individuals, gaining access and establishing relationships, purposive sampling, collecting data, recording information, solving field problems, and storing data—collection techniques using interviews, observation, documentation, and focus group discussion. Data processing uses method triangulation and source triangulation as a form of data credibility test. At the same time, the data analysis technique uses the Soft System Methodology data analysis technique.

Big Islands Defense Concept

The big islands, in the doctrine of "Tri Ubaya Çakti," are places where all forces are prepared. Large islands with the presence of forces prepared to make it a point of strength. Large islands, in this context, have less coherent consequences for the presence of these forces as the system theory put forward by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) and Stalter et al. (2017), to influence the shape and capabilities of these forces, considering that large islands are positioned as places. In this context, large islands are not interpreted as a system component but rather as the system's environment, as the results of Kasianiuk's research (2020). Large islands as the central area of defense, no matter how wide the island or the shape of the island, have little influence on the main areas of defense. Alternatively, is it simply a dislocation of the elements of the defense force? This theoretical approach to the large islands in the "Tri Ubaya Çakti" doctrine shows that there is a theoretical gap to be applied as a defense system.

Systems theory Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) and Stalter et al. (2017) explained that large islands are a component of an island defense system along with mobile defense force components, and have one or more strategic compartments that are integrated into one defense command. All of these components become means entities that are ready to be deployed in various forms of operations (ways) to achieve the ends, namely protecting, defending, and maintaining the integrity of the national land area (Kodiklat TNI AD, 2003, p. 25), which is the essence of national defense. This is an intercorrelation of components in the defense system that can be developed in developing strategies, both ends, means, and ways, as strategy theory (Bowdish, 2013; Gray, 2015).

The Defense of the Large Islands was initiated in the Army Doctrine (1966), which made the main islands the areas where all national

defense forces, both the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the components of reserves, civil defense, and people's resistance, were based. In this context, the main islands become the dislocation of the existence of all national forces in defense. Large islands are also the main areas of defense which are strong points in the national defense system. This is the central point for deploying and directing forces in defense operations, whether a strategic offensive is to be carried out by considering the balance of forces or a strategic defense by developing regional resistance.

The Indonesian Main Island Defense is the base of the regional defense system. The Indonesian Main Island Defense becomes a strategic defense compartment as a final form of struggle in defending sovereignty on land. The Indonesian Main Island Defense can be arranged in one or more strategic compartments, which are integrated into one defense command. Suhardo (1993) says that the large islands of the archipelago (including the small islands around them) can be illustrated by a series of solid defense points in the broader context of the archipelago's defense system. In this context, large islands can function as a shield of defense, channeling enemy movements, and can also be areas of destruction. Suhardo explained further that, to realize this, the development of

The Indonesian Main Island Defense needs to pay attention to each large island's geographical and demographic conditions. Suharto also emphasized the critical factors in preparing The Indonesian Main Island Defense, namely: organizational structure, authority and responsibility, command and control, relations between strategic compartments and other component dimensions, and the National Police (p. 51).

Center of Gravity

Clausewitz (1832/1984) explained that, in general, COG is found where the mass is most

concentrated, which is the most dangerous attacking force (the heaviest blow), as well as the most strategic attack target (effective target for a blow). Clausewitz's argument in this approach is based on the scale of victory, which is placed on the size of the defeated force (the defeated force). For this purpose, the main target is the greatest concentration of enemy forces. The greater the power used to conquer the greatest concentration of power, the more guaranteed the effect will be in the form of an even grander scale of victory. This approach describes the characteristics and effects of the center of gravity (Clausewitz, 1832/1984, p. 485).

Clausewitz's (1832/1984) explanation of the center of gravity in *On War* is generally associated with military operational tactics in battle. The explanation in the scope of operational tactics is aimed at how troop strength is to destroy enemy COGs in battle. By looking at the scope of this discussion, the meaning of COG becomes narrow, as Bassford (1994, p. 27) argues that "the center of gravity is the most important source of the enemy's strength." The main strength of the enemy in this context can be the fighting strength of the Army, capital, alliance, or public opinion. This is evidenced in Quackenbush's research (2016) which concluded that the three COGs are vital in War, namely conquering the enemy's capital, destroying the enemy's military forces, and eliminating alliances from War, it is evident that each type of COG makes the most significant victory possible.

Results

Defense of the Big Islands has become a mandate in the implementation of national defense by Presidential Regulation Number 8 of 2021 concerning General National Defense Policies for 2020-2024, where one of them is the implementation of an extensive island defense policy. For large islands, it is formulated at the policy level, where the basis of the policy is in the General Policy for

National Defense in Presidential Decree No. 8 of 2021, article 2, paragraph 1; the language is the implementation of the comprehensive island defense policy, it has also been spelled out in the Implementation Policy for National Defense according to Minister of Defense number 12 years 2021.

In 2022 it will be developed, and coincidentally we will get an additional program to continue the concept of defense of large islands, but the game throughout Indonesia has acceded. God willing, this year, we will carry out the concept of defense of these large islands. This contextuality emphasizes the position of Indonesian Main Island Defense as one of the policies that the Presidential Regulation concerning the General Policy of National Defence must implement. This Indonesian Main Island Defense policy can be a guideline for the Indonesian National Armed Forces, especially the Army, in realizing The Indonesian Main Island Defense. The defense of the Big Islands has the essential characteristic of being independent in defense. In a forced situation, if the island is isolated, it must be able to survive and defend its territory independently, not depending on the strength of other islands. Each island ideally should have good logistical capabilities, including meeting the need for ammunition for a protracted war. Apart from that, The Indonesian Main Island Defense also requires infrastructure and facilities related to transportation (Murfi, Personal Communication, 2022).

From a policy standpoint, there is a continuity of policy on the concept of the Defense of the Islands from time to time. There needs to be seriousness from all parties in implementing the policy. Additionally, internally within the Ministry of Defense itself, the derivative policy functions related to defense area strategy, defense potential, defense strength, and planning still need to be fully integrated. In addition, policy synchronization with other ministries is also often constrained. The

organization of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, including the Army, has undergone several validations. The Army has experienced a reduction and increase in the number of Regional Military Commands in the region. There are several existences of the Joint Area Defense Command. However, the context of the idea is not the same as The Indonesian Main Island Defense because the Joint Area Defense Command consists of several large islands. Apart from that, The Indonesian Main Island Defense is also closely related to defense, military, and regional logistics. Military logistics is still concentrated on the Municipalities in the region. Moreover, regional logistics is more complex for The Indonesian Main Island Defense, such as ammunition factories, places, and defense equipment maintenance technicians, to food factories. This is closely related to regional development programs. Overall, from all aspects, it seems that there needs to be rearrangement, and it is related to threat projection (Murfi, Personal Communication, 2022).

In its conceptual and practical order, the discourse on The Indonesian Main Island Defense cannot be separated from the strategic Compartment. Strategic compartments have direct relevance in the arrangement of defense in a sustainable manner, especially in preparing the defense forces on large islands to be ready to face war until the war drags on. The strategic Compartment is closely related to the preparation and empowerment of the region for war, starting from strength and capability to preparing a battlefield that includes land, sea, and air in an integrated manner. How to prepare defense forces sustainably for war becomes the scope of the strategic Compartment. The logistics of the defense of the big island are also included. All of these preparations during peacetime were carried out by the Regional Military Command, and during military and war emergencies, it became the function of the strategic Compartment. The output of this

strategic Compartment is defense independence which is also in line with The Indonesian Main Island Defense. The strategic Compartment is indeed more familiar in the Army. However, the scope of the strategic Compartment is more than land alone but also integrates with the sea and air domains.

Within the Indonesian National Armed Forces, no glossary can explain the definition of certain concepts in a specific and comprehensive manner, especially regarding the strategic compartment and defense of large islands (Indonesian Main Island Defense). This condition also makes each party have their views so that there is no unified perception regarding understanding the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense. This situation is also exacerbated by the need for more official publications and academic studies related to Indonesian Main Island Defense. Parties within the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense, and academics have unique perspectives, ideas, and concepts regarding implementing the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept. However, there may also be those who do not understand it at all. This can make efforts to form a consensus even more complicated. Moreover, discussions between related institutions and academics discussing the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense should be carried out more frequently. If these conditions continue, then the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense will continue to be abstract and has the potential to become a weak point that can reduce the effectiveness of the national defense system.

Theoretically, the application of the strategic compartment concept can indeed be increased up to the significant island level so that on the big island, a more effective and efficient command and control system, as well as the deployment of resources, is formed for more optimal resistance against the enemy military within the island and its surroundings.

However, it should not be forgotten that the original purpose of compartmentalization down to its most minor units was to decentralize power and command and control, making it more difficult for the enemy's military to stop resistance movements. Decentralization is the delegation of authority from the central command to units below it, for example, from the Headquarters of the Indonesian National Armed Forces to the Regional Military Command. In addition, with compartmentalization in a smaller area, coaching is likely to be carried out more optimally because the area of responsibility is narrower. This is to Widjajanto's statement. In addition, Widjajanto argues that large islands can be considered to function as media for extensive maneuvers, having the ability to provide more excellent defense resources and concepts developed to facilitate protracted wars. In addition, Indonesian Main Island Defense does not have to have command over one island but can rely on compartmentalization during an emergency which may one day be combined (Wibawanto, Personal Communication, 2022).

There has not been much significant change regarding the implications of the Defense of the Big Islands concept towards the degree of strength and command control according to the strategic compartment.

This happened because the regulations governing the synchronization between the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept and the strategic compartment so that the Force organization could implement it still needed to be created. In addition, the Army still dominates an understanding of the essence of the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept and strategic compartment because these two concepts have been part of the Army's strategy and doctrine in land defense from the start. There has been almost no discussion of these concepts with the Navy and Air Force. As a result, implementing this concept at the Armed

Forces level has been relatively slow (Widiastawa, Personal Communication, 2022).

The appointment of Indonesian Main Island Defense and the strategic compartment as part of the 2019-2024 National Defense General Policy was separate from an arrangement with the Kogabwilhan. The concept of a strategic compartment has relatively specific roles and authorities, namely having the function of coaching and operations when to activate it, and what units are responsible for implementing it (Kotama, especially the Regional Military Command). On the other hand, the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense needs to explain its function in national defense sufficiently. Apart from that, there has yet to be any synchronization between the strategic compartment and the Defense Area Joint Command in the field (Murfi, Personal Communication, 2022).

Prasetyono conveyed the implications that could occur if the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept was implemented. The emphasis is on the implications when the Indonesian Main Island Defense command concept is juxtaposed with the Defense Area Joint Command organization, which has relatively the same territorial characteristics. It is essential to clearly define functions and authorities between the two to avoid overlapping interests. Prasetyono conveyed that the division of authority between the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept and the Defense Area Joint Command could be based on geography or technology. In addition, considerations for determining identification areas in sea and air space must also elaborate on capability, technology, geography, and threat factors so that the deterrence capability is effective and efficient (Prasetyono, Personal Communication, 2022).

Future war characters are likely technology based. Then the second, the current military weapons technology tends to produce weapons with a high level of destruction. This large

degree of destruction was designed so that the war would be short, turning into a decisive battle, contrary to our fundamental doctrine of protracted warfare. Because of that, as exemplified earlier, China has changed its theater so that there is a combination of utilizing this technology. In essence, this element of technological development can render geography irrelevant because China does not have to intrude into our zones to destroy Java, for example. Because he can launch his missile from the LCS to destroy Java, he can even launch it from Hainan Island. Geography becomes irrelevant, and the presence of troops to set foot in our territory becomes irrelevant because of technological developments, especially when weapons are launched from satellites. That is what now many countries are also reviewing Multi-Domain Operations. Trump, in 2018 formed a new service in the US Army, Named US Multi-Domain Operation Command to ensure that later in 2028, the US Army will be able to carry out embryos, whether conventional or non-conventional, whether hybrid, whether he can carry out land operations but move from sea and air traffic. That is a multi-domain operation command for the US with a 4-star Chief of Staff. The US is already heading in that direction. Of course, NATO will also be moving in the same direction. As mentioned earlier, China has significantly changed its theater command, consistent with its strategic planning to push the war as far as possible from China's coasts to protect economic and industrial growth zones. Instead, they did not want any land resistance, so they wanted victory long before their opponents destroyed the Chinese coast. They will wage war in Guam, the South China Sea, and places far from the Chinese coastline. Technology based is the key. Seeing the latest developments in military technology, the fundamental pillars of our doctrine remain relevant to technological developments. Moreover, technological developments have finally made the territorial

title of the Army must be ready to face and prepare its strength which leads to other domains, not only the maritime sea but also to other domains, such as space and cyber.

Discussion

The concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense develops relatively slowly. It hardly develops at all. Since the beginning of the Reformation Era, the official publication regarding Indonesian Main Island Defense has only occurred once, namely in 2003, until finally, the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense was included in the 2021 General Policy on National Defense. Indonesian Main Island Defense because there are few references to get a clear picture. In addition, even though the terminology of Indonesian Main Island Defense has been included in the National Defense Doctrine Book, there is no more detailed explanation, especially from the doctrinal aspect regarding how the operational/implementation aspects are. This condition creates a situation where there is debate and differences of opinion regarding the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense and how it should be implemented. In addition, the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept has yet to experience much development academically or technically, making it not necessarily applicable and suitable for the current situation and conditions in Indonesia's strategic and security environment.

As an illustration, in the Reformation Era, traditional threats or threats from other countries' militaries were relatively small and dominated by non-traditional threats such as separatism, terrorism, transnational organized crime, horizontal conflicts, and natural disasters. However, after entering 2020 or 30 years later, the threats are increasingly complex where not only non-traditional threats can make it difficult for a country to overcome them (for example, terrorism, insurgency, and separatism carried out by non-state groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State/ ISIS), but traditional

threats are also increasing in trend. The building of large and significant military forces between China, India, and Japan, plus the proliferation of nuclear weapons by China and North Korea, have made the East Asia region increasingly tense.

In Southeast Asia, China's nine-dashed line policy, which intends to claim the South China Sea and the Paracel and Spratly Islands as its own, as well as the establishment of sea and air defense lines up to the second chain island, has not only made the United States wary (because it has an interest in its views on freedom of navigation or freedom of navigation) but also Southeast Asian countries are increasingly disturbed due to the presence of Chinese warships, coast guards and paramilitaries in the South China Sea which intrudes into the EEZ of coastal countries. In addition, the Paracel and Spratly Islands are also militarized by China with the construction of military bases that can be used as berths for warships and strategic bombers because there are not only deep water ports but also a 3,000-meter runway. The large runways can deploy strategic bombers armed with nuclear-tipped strategic cruise missiles, deploy airborne troops, and provide another air cover to China's naval fleet without the assistance of aircraft carriers.

The frequency and scale of occurrence of traditional conflicts have also relatively increased, especially in the last two years. There were bloody clashes in 2020 until there were deaths between the Indian and Chinese military forces stationed in the disputed territory of the two on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas. Although the clashes in the Himalayas are not using firearms, these events are infrequent. In 2020 there was also a border war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was relatively large, both in terms of the use of force and the areas affected. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani military extensively used military and civilian

drones and succeeded in helping it win the border conflict against Armenia. Since then, military interest worldwide in using drones as part of their force has only grown. Shortly after this relatively sizeable military conflict, at the end of 2021, Russia deployed many troops to the Russian border adjacent to Ukraine and stationed troops on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border.

The General Policy on National Defense, just passed in early 2021, has yet to comprehensively include the threat of potential large-scale border wars, which started to appear in 2020. In addition, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 shows that the risk of an invasion from a regional power to the surrounding country is becoming more and more likely. With the 2020 National Defense General Policy not being updated after the emergence of increasingly high-scale threats of open war, more academic and practical discussions are needed regarding defense strategies to counteract threats of invasion aggression.

In addition, the elaboration between the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept and the strategic compartment in dealing with the threat of invasion must be further enhanced, which is also strengthened by an updated defense policy on the trends that have occurred in the last two years. Especially regarding the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept, which is still rarely discussed academically and technically and has not been elaborated and synchronized in-depth and comprehensively with the General Policy for National Defense 2021 and with the Kogabwilhan organization, this is an urgent need that must be carried out as soon as possible, bearing in mind the possibility of an increasing threat in the form of an invasion.

The concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense and the strategic compartment itself has many drawbacks. However, this deficiency is separate from the vision of why the concept

of Indonesian Main Island Defense and strategic compartments needs to be carried out. However, because there are too many conceptual 'blanks,' there are many incompatibilities with existing/applicable regulations and defense organizational systems, and their relevance are difficult to relate to environmental conditions. The strategy now and in the future. This condition illustrates that several synchronization tasks must be carried out to the organization of the TNI in general and specifically to the Regional Military Command, which plays the leading role in the land defense system. Synchronization must be carried out so that the Indonesian Main Island Defense concept and strategic compartment can be adaptive, relevant, implementable, and able to answer challenges in the field of defense without creating new problems, especially in terms of the existing TNI organizational structure, command, and control systems, deployment/operations, coaching, and logistics.

Fundamentally, the concept of a strategic compartment was formed to make it difficult for attackers to control Indonesia as a whole in a short time and make it easier for Indonesia to mobilize its resources to carry out a protracted war throughout the region when the central government or central military command manages to sever ties with military forces in the regions (Kotama, especially in Kodam), the central government or central military command is wholly controlled, or annihilated by the enemy. Strategic compartments can be said to be emergency agencies that can be 'activated' in times of emergency to create pockets of resistance against an attacking enemy, where these pockets are independent and self-sufficient in terms of leadership, organization, coaching, operations, and logistics to wage a protracted war. Strategic compartments are deliberately made as much as possible. The concept for each Kodam is a strategic compartment that will fight against the

enemy independently when the primary conditions are met (for example, when the enemy controls the central government and military power).

Many strategic compartments aim to form as many pockets of resistance as possible, which act as centers of gravity, which inevitably must be controlled or eliminated by the enemy to stop resistance in an area. The strategic compartment is given the authority to foster and mobilize people's/civilian forces from both the human and material aspects for a protracted war in expelling the enemy. This concept is no different from guerrilla warfare, which seeks to expel opposing forces with a protracted war while forming a regular military force to provide the 'guerrilla' with decisive 'hit power.' However, it should be underlined that the strategic compartment will only be activated if the enemy manages to penetrate the two outer defense zones, namely the buffer zone (outer) and the defense zone (in), or when it is assumed that the two zones will collapse shortly. The position of the strategic compartment is in the zone of resistance as its core.

The concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense in supporting land defense has great strategic benefits. Indonesia has a vast territory and is dominated by the sea. However, there are more than 17,000 islands, of which there are five major islands, namely Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Even though the sea and airspace dominate it, the role of the land remains crucial for Indonesia's defense. In the end, the land is the last line of national defense and becomes a point of resistance after the enemy controls the sea and airspace. In addition, no matter how intense the sea or air power in a country is, both of them still need land as a command center, base, place for gathering forces, coaching, and generally, a place for 4R (repair, refuel, resupply, recreation) to be carried out.

In addition, the center of gravity (COG) in every country is generally a place that is the

center of government and state administration, and of course, it is also on land. In Indonesia, the nation's capital is always placed on a large island. In the military emergency scenario during the Dutch Military Aggression, it was always decided to move the state capital to the big islands, namely Java Island (when the state capital moved from Jakarta to Yogyakarta) and Sumatra Island (when the State Capital was moved from Yogyakarta to Bukittinggi). The discourse on moving the State Capital from Jakarta to the Archipelago was also determined to be located on the big island, namely Kalimantan Island. The tendency is that Indonesia always makes the big island the location of the center of state government, which means that Indonesia's COG is always on the big island.

This condition is inseparable from the advantages of the big island itself, which is profitable, especially for land defense. The big island in Indonesia has a relatively wide land area. Large areas will be increasingly difficult for the enemy to occupy because it is easier and allows for a layered defense system to be implemented. In addition, every central island in Indonesia has an elevation, mountains, rivers, marshes and beaches so it can be an excellent natural barrier for land defense. Large islands also provide vast maneuvering space and can support the accumulation of forces in enormous numbers because most of Indonesia's population is relatively concentrated on large islands. The big island in Indonesia also contains many resources that are very important to maintain the continuity of the struggle against the enemy, both natural for raw material needs, as well as human power that can be mobilized with brute force, intellect, and expertise for defense purposes. The readiness of infrastructure and facilities and infrastructure are also relatively more ready on large islands compared to islands with smaller landmass.

Not only can it support the implementation of the strategic compartment concept for deploying resistance capabilities in its territory, with relatively large resources owned, but large islands can also be further developed and empowered to protect the surrounding island groups or other large islands. With such great potential, large islands should become one of the essential points in realizing national defense, especially in the land dimension. Increasingly sophisticated technological support, both in the fields of sensing, communication and information, transportation, and weapons systems that are increasingly remote, makes it possible for land defense systems to support other dimensions, both at sea and in the air and even help realize regional defense.

With its extensive resources, a large island deserves to be used as a large-scale logistics depot. In addition, the availability of large numbers of human resources on large islands can also be mobilized and deployed for more effective defense needs, both labor-intensive and technology-intensive. A relatively more prepared infrastructure offset by a relatively large area makes large islands capable of building complex military bases and defense installations and can easily create a layered defense system that is difficult to destroy/control.

The existence of high-tech military equipment such as high-precision missiles makes the land defense even more challenging to penetrate armed with a ground-to-air defense system that does not only have a point range but is also able to have an area coverage. The missile system can be utilized for regional air defense purposes from the threat of fighter planes. On the other hand, increasingly advanced anti-ship missile technology allows land-based missile batteries to disable or sink warships from a great distance. These conditions make coastal and sea defense possible even through inland areas on land to maintain the security of these

installations. Missile artillery technology (MLRS-multi launch rocket system) can also attack targets with great precision from very long distances, from tens to hundreds of kilometers, and has high mobility to avoid counterfire.

Advances in weapons technology that are capable of reaching a distance as vast as the area, both for land, sea, and air targets, make it increasingly possible that defense at sea and in the air can be supported by land-based equipment from large islands to smaller archipelago groups or within the large islands. Alone. The effectiveness of high-precision missile systems is increasingly sharpened by satellite and drone-based sensing technology, which is increasingly sophisticated and relatively inexpensive and is capable of carrying out persistent surveillance to increase high situational awareness, make it easier to read enemy movements, find targets, and help correct fire to more accurate artillery fire.

However, unfortunately, even though technology has advanced so much, accompanied by developments in military doctrine and organization, which are becoming more mature at the world level, especially in the United States, Britain, Europe, and China, on the part of the Indonesian military, especially the Indonesian Army, it has not been sufficiently responsive to these developments, as previously stated and described in the previous section. In addition to the lack of developing and adapting new doctrines to current trends in threat development, acquiring the latest military technology for adequate defense is progressing slower. Technology acquisition has also not been accompanied by an effective and efficient basing (headquarters) and logistics system, so coaching, gathering forces, and practical deployment are not optimal.

The concept of defense for large islands and strategic compartments that still need to be sufficiently developed and elaborated with

current threat models is a crucial issue that must be resolved as soon as possible. Apart from that, the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense and strategic compartments have yet to be synchronized with the organizational development of the TNI, particularly the Kogabwilhan, through clear regulations. The concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense and the strategic compartment has mostly stayed the same since 2003 until now. Even though the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense and the strategic compartment has been included in the provisions of the General Policy on National Defense in 2021, thus made its implementation is complex in the field. At the Armed Forces level, due to a lack of understanding of existing concepts and a lack of knowledge of their relevance to current and future defense needs, the development of concepts and their adoption in the Armed Forces could be faster.

In addition, both the supporting component and reserve component concepts do not include aspects of natural resources as part of assets for national defense. Supporting Components and Reserve Components still need to be elaborated on and synchronized with strategic compartments. Even though this is very important because one of the functions of the strategic compartment is to mobilize civilians for defense purposes, while the provisions regarding the mobilization of civilian forces are regulated in the provisions concerning supporting component and reserve component, suppose the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense and strategic compartments can be elaborated and synchronized with TNI organizations and resources as well as national resources. In that case, the effectiveness of state defense, especially in the land dimension, can undoubtedly be increased. Therefore, synchronizing the concept of synchronizing the concept of Indonesian Main Island Defense and strategic compartments to TNI organizations, defense organizations in general, and future

threat models is very vital for Indonesia's national defense.

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